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The 1996 Farm Bill, now known as the FAIR (Federal Agricultural Improvement
and Reform) Act of 1996, has been portrayed as reforming U.S. agricultural policy.
Gone are set aside and base acreage controls over farm planting decisions.  Gone,
too, are deficiency payment programs that provided protection against downward
price movements for producers of program commodities. According to conventional
wisdom, the FAIR Act provides an environment in which farmers enjoy greater
production flexibility, but face much more risk.
In fact, careful examination of the FAIR Act innovations leads to the conclusion that
no radical changes have been made in food and feed grain agricultural policies, and
that it is unlikely that the FAIR Act will cause large changes in crop acreages.
The framework for the agricultural price and income support programs of the 1980s
and 1990s was established by the 1973 Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act.
The key elements for wheat, barley, and rice were target prices and deficiency
payments and price supports for each crop through nonrecourse loan programs.
In contrast, the FAIR Act creates a much simpler system of transfer payments for
food grain and feed grain producers.  Nonrecourse loan programs remain, but
variable deficiency payments are replaced by fixed market transition payments for
the period 1996 to 2002.  For each program crop, producers receive payments of 85
percent of their 1996 crop acreage base multiplied by their 1995 program crop
yields.  Producers can plant any crops (other than fruits and vegetables) on their land
(unless it is CRP land). This paper discusses the following aspects of the farm
program:
Decoupling: Most links at the farm level between current production decisions and
current or future deficiency payments were severed by the provisions of the 1985 Act
which froze program yields at 1985 levels. The FAIR Act can therefore be viewed
as simply completing a decoupling process between deficiency payments and
production decisions, by ending the system that actually required farmers to plant
program crops on base acres to receive government transfer payments.
Elimination of acreage reduction programs: By the 1990s the role of ARPs in
controlling supplies had diminished for wheat and feed grains, partly because of the
1988 and 1989 droughts which reduced inventories, and partly because of higher
prices associated with the advent of the CRP and land retirement through the 0-92
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Production Flexibility: The rules governing base acreage calculations under the 1981 and
1985 farm bills made it costly for producers to switch to nonprogram crops like soybeans.
However, these problems were mitigated in the 1990 Act which allowed program crop
producers to reallocate up to twenty-five percent of their base acres to other crops. In fact,
the planting flexibility provided by the 1990 Act has never been fully utilized by producers.
The planting flexibility of the 1996 Act therefore seems unlikely to have significant effects
on farmers planting decisions.
Federal Spending: Whether the FAIR Act involves a cut in support for feed and food grain
producers is also unclear. Under the Act, wheat and feed grain producers will receive $29.2
billion in market transition payments over the next seven years.  Based on current estimates,
these payments are likely to be higher than those that would have been made under the 1990
Act provisions because wheat and feed grain prices are forecast to be relatively high over the
period 1996-1997.
Farm Income Variability: Much has also been made of the effects of the FAIR ACT on
the farm safety net.  Yet, in fact, price-based deficiency payments provided little income
stability to producers with low yields when prices were high, since in that case deficiency
payments were small. In fact, increased planting flexibility may actually provide some
degree of income stability to producers by allowing them to respond to shifts in relative
prices for different crops. In addition, the 1996 Act provides minimum guarantees for
revenue streams through the market transition payment system.  As these payments decline
over the duration of the Act, they will become less important as a source of income stability.
By 2002, Congress will have to readdress farm programs, including food and feed grain
policies. Whether the 1996 Act represents the end of large scale farm subsidies therefore
remains an open question.  One interpretation of  the 1996 legislation is that it is providing
aid to the farm sector as it moves towards a new subsidy environment rather than a no
subsidy environment.  In the interim, although the FAIR Act involves substantive changes
in the structure of U.S. agricultural policy, its actual effects on agricultural production seem
likely to be small.
 .Table of Contents
The Development of Food and Feed Grain Agricultural
Policies: 1973-1996..................................................................................... 1
Decoupling support from actual production ......................................... 3
Elimination of acreage reduction programs .......................................... 3
Increased planting flexibility ................................................................. 4
Reduction in support level .................................................................... 5
Income variability.................................................................................. 8
Other issues........................................................................................... 8
Effects of the 1996 Act on Wheat and Feed Grain  ....................9
The effects on supply variability.......................................................... 10




Table 1. Summary of Compliance Reports........................................... 5
Table 2. Target Prices, Loan Rates, and Deficiency
 Payments for Wheat and Corn, 1981-1995 ............................ 6
Table 3. Planned Food and Feed Grain Market
 Transition Payments, 1996-2002............................................ 7Farm Bill Legislation 1973-1996
1973  Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act
1977  Food and Agriculture Act
1981  Agriculture and Food Act
1985  Food Security Act
1990  Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act
1996  Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act  THE EFFECTS OF THE 1996 FARM BILL
ON FOOD AND FEED GRAINS
The 1996 Farm Bill, which as enacted legislation is known as the FAIR (Fed-
eral Agricultural Improvement and Reform) Act of 1996, has been portrayed
as reforming U.S. agricultural policy. Gone are set aside and base acreage
controls over farm planting decisions.  Gone, too, are deficiency payment
programs that provided protection against downward price movements for
producers of program commodities. According to conventional wisdom, the
FAIR Act provides an environment in which farmers enjoy greater produc-
tion flexibility but face much more risk.
Yet, early assessments of the FAIR Act suggest that the aggregate impacts of
the commodity provisions of the Act are relatively small (see FAPRI [1996]
and USDA [1996]).  With the exception of rice acreage, which is projected
to fall as rice income transfer payments are decoupled from production, these
studies conclude that any changes in planted acreage for major farm program
crops, such as wheat and feed grains, are more likely to reflect changes in the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), a voluntary ten-year paid acreage
retirement program initiated by the 1985 Food Security Act, rather than
changes in the income support programs engendered by the FAIR Act.
This paper examines the implications of the FAIR Act for wheat, feed grains,
and rice markets, and for producers of those commodities.  Careful examina-
tion of the FAIR Act policy innovations for these commodities does not lead
to the conclusion that radical changes have been made to the direction in
which food and feed grain agricultural policies have been moving over the
past eleven years.  Also, it seems unlikely that the so-called Freedom  to
Farm changes in programs for these commodities embedded in the FAIR
Act will result in large changes in crop acreage or will have large effects on
the year-to-year variability or riskiness of farm revenues from these crops.
The formal changes in policy incorporated in the FAIR Act are substantive,
but their effective consequences are modest.
The Development of Food and Feed Grain Agricultural
Policies:  1973-1996
Over the sixty-three year period between the passage of the 1933 Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act and the FAIR Act, substantial changes were made to
the tools of agricultural policy, the degree of farm gate price and income
stability they provide, the levels of income transfers they engender, and the
Does the Fair Act
represent a radical
change in U.S. food and
feed grain farm policy?
   TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 1incentive they create for changes in land use. The 1973 Agriculture and
Consumer Protection Act established the framework within which price and
income support programs were implemented in the 1980s and 1990s.  This
framework was substantially different from that which prevailed between
1948 and 1973. The key elements of the agricultural support policies intro-
duced by the 1973 legislation for the program commodities wheat, corn,
grain sorghum, barley, oats, upland cotton, and rice, were target prices and
deficiency payments.  The Act also retained price supports for each crop
through nonrecourse loan programs.  Under these loan programs, farmers
could receive nonrecourse loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) for all of a crop raised on eligible acres (acres on which farmers
were legally allowed to produce that crop).  The amount of the crop loan
was equal to the output of the crop multiplied by the loan rate, which there-
fore served as a minimum support price.
The 1973 Act created an income transfer program.  Producers of program
commodities were provided with base acreages for each program crop, and
crop-specific payment yields were assigned to these base acres.  In any given
year, producers received deficiency payments for a particular crop based on
the difference, if positive, between the target price and the national average
market price for the commodity or the loan rate, whichever was greater.
Producer payments were then established by multiplying the deficiency pay-
ment rate by the producers eligible production (eligible program base acre-
age times program yield).
In contrast, the FAIR Act creates a much simpler system of transfer pay-
ments for food grain and feed grain producers.  While nonrecourse loan
programs remain in place, price-based variable deficiency payments have
been replaced by fixed market transition payments over the seven crop years
from 1996 to 2002.  Participating producers now receive market transition
payments equal to their payment production times the payment rate.  For
each program crop (described in the FAIR Act as contract commodities),
each producers payment production equals eighty-five percent of the 1996
crop acreage base times the producers 1995 program yield for the crop.
Producers may plant any crops they choose other than fruits and vegetables
on land eligible for production (that is, land whose use is not restricted by
commitments under other programs such the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram)  and receive market transition payments for contract commodities.
Several aspects of the structure and historical development of agricultural
income support programs over the 1973-1996 period are of interest in evalu-
ating the degree to which the FAIR Act represents a radical change in the
development of U.S. agricultural policy.  These aspects include a) the issue
of decoupling of income support payments from actual production, b) the
The 1996 Fair Act
creates a much simpler
system of government
payments for food and
feed grain producers.
8 EFFECTS OF THE 1996 FARM BILL ...elimination of acreage reduction programs, c) increased production flexibil-
ity, d) reductions in federal on line budget outlays for agriculture, and e) the
effects of farm programs on the variability of farm income.  Each of these
issues is examined below.  Careful examination of the provisions of the FAIR
Act in relation to each of these issues suggests that many popular concep-
tions about its implications are probably misconceptions.
Decoupling support from actual production.  The farm program established
by the 1973 legislation began to decouple government income transfers for
program commodities from current output levels.  Unlike the nonrecourse
loan program, under which crop support loans are based on the producers
actual production level, the size of the farmers deficiency payment was
determined by the farms payment production, not the current years
production level.  However, prior to the 1985 Food Security Act, current
production decisions could affect deficiency payments by altering both base
acres and assigned yields in subsequent years.  For example, under the
Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, the Secretary of Agriculture was given
discretion to set a producers base acreage on the basis of the previous years
plantings or an average of the two previous years plantings.  Under the
1985 Act, a farms crop acreage base was set equal to the simple arithmetic
average of the acreage planted, or considered planted, to that crop in the five
previous years.  If a producer overplanted his base, he was ineligible for
payments that year.  This change substantially reduced the potential for building
crop acreage base, because of the relatively stiff penalty it placed on producers
who overplanted their base acreage.
Prior to the 1985 Act, a farms effective payment yield was set equal to the
average yield for that county or a higher proven yield for the farm based on
an Olympic average of the five previous crop years (calculated by dropping
the highest and lowest years from the average).  This approach allowed in-
come transfers to farmers to increase over time as average crop yields in-
creased in response to improvements in technology and/or farm input deci-
sions.  The 1985 Act froze program yields at 1985 levels.  Therefore, most
links at the farm level between current production decisions and current or
future deficiency payment income transfers had been severed by the 1986
crop year.  In this context, the FAIR Act can be viewed as completing the
decoupling process for deficiency payments and production decisions that
began in 1973, by ending the system that actually required farmers to plant
program crops on base acres in order to receive government transfer pay-
ments.  Under the FAIR Act, base acres have been renamed contract acres,
but producers do not have to plant program crops to receive income trans-
fers in the form of market transition payments.
Most links at the farm
level between current
production decisions
and current or future
deficiency payments
had been severed by the
1986 crop year.




   TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 3Elimination of acreage reduction programs.  Under the FAIR Act, annual
acreage reduction programs were eliminated, so food and feed grain farmers
now have almost complete flexibility over crop planting and production de-
cisions.  Under previous legislation, to be eligible for deficiency payments, a
producer had to participate in the annual acreage reduction program.  Acre-
age reduction programs were implemented to control the costs of deficiency
payments and nonrecourse loan outlays through restricting the amount of
production eligible for payment, by taking land out of production and at-
tempting to keep prices relatively high (and deficiency payment rates rela-
tively low).  As market prices fell in the early 1980s, deficiency payments,
and loan forfeitures increased.  As a result, acreage reduction percentages
also increased.  In 1986, for example, corn and wheat producers, respec-
tively, had to set aside twenty-five percent and thirty percent of their base
acreage to be eligible for deficiency payments.
By the late 1980s, the role of acreage reduction levels in controlling supplies
had diminished considerably for wheat and feed grains.  This was due in part
to the droughts of 1988 and 1989, which sharply reduced large government-
owned inventories of wheat and feed grains that had overhung those mar-
kets in the early and mid-1980s.  Secondly, for a variety of reasons (includ-
ing drought and pessimistic expectations about market conditions), some
producers chose to place their program acreage in the so-called 0-92 pro-
gram established under the 1985 Act.  Under this program, producers could
place crop acreage base in a  conserving use and receive ninety-two percent
of the expected deficiency payment.  Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly,
by the early 1990s enrollment in the CRP had resulted in the long-term re-
tirement of over ten million acres of wheat base acres and ten million acres
of feed grain base, substantially reducing the need for annual acreage reduc-
tion programs.
Increased planting flexibility.  The rules governing base acreage calcula-
tions under the 1981 and 1985 farm bills made it costly for producers to
switch to nonprogram crops like soybeans. Planting less program crop acre-
age reduced the eligible base acreage in subsequent years.  For example,
under the 1985 Act, a producer with a 100-acre corn base who chose to
plant soybeans on those acres, would lose twenty acres of corn base in the
subsequent year and ultimately one-third of that base, unless he left the pro-
gram to rebuild the base.  Soybean acreage fell by over ten million acres
from 1982 to 1985,  in large part because of the level of the corn target price
relative to soybean prices.  When soybean prices rose sharply relative to
corn prices in the late 1980s, producers had little or no ability to shift pro-
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10 EFFECTS OF THE 1996 FARM BILL ...These problems were mitigated in the 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation
and Trade Act, which introduced the concepts of normal flex acres and op-
tional flex acres.  Under the 1990 Act, producers could plant any program
crop and most nonprogram crops on up to fifteen percent of their base acre-
age, (normal flex acres).  In addition, producers could choose to forego defi-
ciency payments on an additional ten percent of their base acres for each
program crop in return for the right to plant those acres (optional flex acres)
in other crops, including other program crops. Thus, after 1990, program
crop producers could choose to reallocate up to twenty-five percent of their
base acres to other crops.
Table 1.   Summary of Compliance Reports, 1992-1995
Program crop Percent of Normal Flex Acres  Percent of
Optional Flex
    Planted to      Planted to     Idled 1/ Acres planted
    that crop     another crop to another crop
Wheat 48.9 24.9 26.2 7.8
Corn 2/ 54.5 36.7 8.8 9.0
Grain Sorghum 3/ 30.6 42.2 27.2 9.9
Barley 22.9 41.7 35.4 14.6
Oats 15.9 53.7 30.4 35.6
Upland cotton 67.8 15.0 17.1 3.1
Rice 30.5 46.5 22.9 7.5
Source: Young and Westcott
1/ Total flex acres minus acres reported planted to that crop minus acres planted to another crop.
2/ Normal flex acres planted to another crop includes acreage planted to sorghum.
3/ Normal flex acres planted to another crop includes acreage planted to corn.
The evidence presented in Table 1 suggests that the planting flexibility pro-
vided by the 1990 Act has never been fully utilized by producers.  While this
planting flexibility contributed to the five percent increase in soybean acreage
witnessed since 1990, program compliance data for crop years 1992-1995
showed that for corn and wheat, about fifty percent of normal flex acres and
over ninety percent of optional flex acres remained planted to those crops.
Moreover, in no state did the planted acres for program food and feed grain
crops (or soybeans) rise or fall by more than fifteen percent between 1990
and 1995.  Thus, it is unlikely that the removal of all restrictions on planting
decisions at the individual farm level will have any significant effect on total
acres planted to individual program crops. The planting flexibility created by
The effects of the 1996
FAIR Act planting
 flexibility provisions on
aggregate supplies of
individual crops have
been, and are likely to
continue to be, quite
modest.
   TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 5the provisions of the FAIR Act increased the planting choices available to
U.S. food and feed grain producers.  As a result, some farmers may make
substantial changes in the mix of crops they grow.  However, the effects of the
FAIR Act planting flexibility provisions on aggregate supplies of individual
crops have been, and are likely to continue to be, quite modest.
Reduction in support levels.  An additional issue is whether or not the FAIR
Act involves a cut in support for the farm sector in general, and feed and food
grain producers in particular.  A related concern is whether the 1996 legisla-
tion genuinely represents the beginning of the end for income transfer pay-
ments to agricultural producers, as some policy makers have suggested.
Budgetary considerations have played major roles in the debate surrounding
the development of farm policies over the past fifteen years.  Between 1981
and 1985, target prices for wheat and corn rose fifteen and twenty-six per-
cent, respectively as shown in Table 2.  By 1985, the nonrecourse loan rates
for wheat and corn were $3.30 per bushel and $2.55 per bushel, respectively.
The results of these relatively high loan rates were large government invento-
ries, and steadily increasing deficiency payments.  Total deficiency payments
for wheat and feed grains rose from $696 million for the 1981 crop year to
$4.4 billion for the 1985 crop year.
Table 2.  Target Prices, Loan Rates, and Deficiency Payments for
                 Wheat and Corn, 1981-1995
    (dollars per bushel)
Wheat     Corn
Marketing Target Loan Deficiency Target Loan Deficiency
Year Price Rate Payment Price Rate Payment
1981 $3.81 $3.20 $0.12 $2.40 $2.40 $0.00
1982 6.05 3.55 0.50 2.70 2.55 0.15
1983 4.30 3.65 0.65 2.86 2.65 0.00
1984 4.38 3.30 1.00 3.03 2.55 0.43
1985 4.38 3.30 1.08 3.03 2.55 0.48
1986 4.38 2.40 1.96 3.03 1.92 1.11
1987 4.38 2.28 1.81 3.03 1.82 1.11
1988 4.29 2.21 0.69 2.93 1.77 1.09
1989 4.10 2.05 0.32 2.84 1.65 0.36
1990 4.00 1.95 1.28 2.75 1.57 0.51
1991 4.00 2.04 1.35 2.75 1.62 0.41
1992 4.00 2.21 0.81 2.75 1.72 0.73
1993 4.00 2.45 1.03 2.75 1.72 0.28
1994 4.00 2.58 0.95 2.75 1.89 0.57
1995 4.00 2.58 0.00 2.75 1.89 0.00
Source:  USDA Agricultural Outlook (various issues).
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Under the 1985 Act, loan rates for wheat and feed grains were based on a
percentage of past market prices.  The Secretary of Agriculture was also
given discretionary authority to further reduce the loan rate for a commodity
if the previous years market price was less than 110 percent of the previous
years loan rate.  As a result, the 1986 crop loan rates for wheat and corn fell
by twenty-seven and  twenty-five percent from 1985 levels; by 1990, they
were forty percent below 1985 levels.  Target prices for wheat and feed grains
were held constant at 1985 levels for the 1986 and 1987 crop years but were
then reduced by about  nine percent between 1987 and 1990.  Nonetheless,
deficiency payments for those crops remained large throughout the period
covered by the 1985 farm bill, averaging $6.9 billion per year in nominal terms.
Under the 1990 Act, target price maximums were fixed at 1989 levels, but to
meet federal budget targets, fifteen percent of all crop acreage bases became
ineligible for deficiency payments.  This provision further reduced the amount
of production eligible for deficiency payments, continuing the trend which
began in the 1985 Act with the freezing of program yields (Westcott, 1993).
Deficiency payments for wheat and feed grains averaged less than $4.0 billion
annually over the 1991-1995 crop years.  However, because of their
countercyclical nature, total deficiency payments varied, ranging from $5.4
billion in 1992, when commodity prices were low, to zero in 1995, when
commodity prices exceeded target prices.
Under the FAIR Act, wheat and feed grain producers will receive $29.2 bil-
lion in market transition payments over seven years.  While the total amount is
roughly equal to the level of payments for wheat and feed grains for the seven
previous fiscal years (as shown in Table 3), payment levels are scheduled to
decline over the period, falling from a maximum of $6.4 billion in 1997 to
$3.2 billion in 2002.  When first proposed by Congressman Pat  Roberts in
July 1995, the Freedom to Farm Act was projected to save $13 billion over
seven years compared to a continuation of the 1990 Act.  Opponents in Con-
gress heavily criticized these cuts.
Table 3.    Planned Food and Feed Grain Market Transition Payments,
                 1996-2002
Year Wheat       Corn        Other Feed Total
         Grains*
(billion  dollars)
1996           $1.46           $2.57           $0.42           $4.45
1997 1.41 2.49 0.40 4.30
1998 1.52 2.68  0.43  4.63
1999 1.47 2.59  0.42 4.48
2000 1.35 2.37  0.38 4.10
2001 1.08 1.91 0.31 3.30
2002 1.05 1.85 0.30 3.20
* These include grain sorghum, barley, and oats.
Source:  USDA.
   TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 7Ironically, based on current estimates, the FAIR Act is likely to result in
higher income transfers to farmers than those that would have been paid if
the 1990 Act had been extended.   Strong export markets, combined with
domestic crop shortfalls, sent wheat and feed grain prices above target price
levels in 1995, and wheat prices remained relatively high in 1996.  In De-
cember 1995, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the FAIR Act
would save only $1 billion over a continuation of the 1990 Act.  The view of
the administration on potential budget savings was more pessimistic.  Based
on the presidents  January 1996 budget baseline, the USDA estimated that
the new farm bill was likely to cost over $24 billion more than the continua-
tion of the 1990 Act.  These budget estimates underscore the countercyclical
nature of deficiency payments, and help to explain why the FAIR Act was so
widely supported by wheat and feed grain producers.
Income variability.  By far the most controversial feature of the FAIR Act
was the replacement of price-based deficiency payments with fixed payments.
The 1973 target price/deficiency program payment guaranteed farmers at
least the target price for all output they produced on planted base acres in
years when actual yields fell below program yields.  During years when ac-
tual yields exceeded program yields, they would receive at least the target
price on program yields.  In addition, they also received some protection
against very low prices on all eligible output through the nonrecourse loan
program.  Thus, the target price/deficiency payment program has been viewed
correctly as providing farmers with hedges against downside price risk.
The target price/deficiency payment program has also been viewed as pro-
viding producers with a degree of revenue insurance that is not available
under the FAIR Act.  However, the effectiveness of deficiency payments in
providing revenue protection can be questioned on two grounds.  First, as
pointed out previously, the percent of actual production covered by defi-
ciency payments has declined under the 1985 and 1990 farm bills.  Frozen
program yields and the creation of nonpayment acres in 1990 meant that less
than seventy-five percent of expected production was typically covered by
deficiency payments (Westcott,1993).  Second, the effectiveness of deficiency
payments in providing revenue protection depended on the degree to which
an individual producers yield was correlated to aggregate yield and price.
Widespread droughts typically resulted in high prices and small deficiency
payments.  Thus, deficiency payments were often poor instruments to offset
declines in revenue caused by low yields.
Other issues. The FAIR Act was also noteworthy because of some programs
with which it did not grapple thoroughly.  Foremost among these, from the
perspective of  the food and feed grains sector, was the Conservation Re-
serve Program.  Both Congress and the Clinton Administration agreed that
...deficiency payments
were often poor instru-
ments to offset declines
in revenue caused by
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14 EFFECTS OF THE 1996 FARM BILL ...the CRP should be extended, and that the FAIR Act should define the maxi-
mum acreage for the program between 1996 and 2002 as 36.4 million acres.
However, the Act did not indicate precise criteria for program eligibility.
These unresolved issues mattered profoundly.  If a high priority were placed
on water quality criteria, then land in feed and food grain producing regions
currently in the CRP would move back into production.  In contrast, if an
emphasis were placed on soil erodibility and wildlife, then higher rents would
have to be paid to keep land in the CRP in grain producing areas such as the
Northern Plains and the Midwest. In the latter case, feed and food grain
producers would  be better off, and U.S. production of these commodities
would be lower.  The final rule for the CRP was amended in February 1997,
and the initial producer sign-up under the re-authorized CRP was completed
in March 1997.  The new rule did not substantially affect the geographic
distribution of enrollments or payments in food and feed producing regions.
Federal crop insurance programs also provide substantial subsidies for food
and feed grain producers, especially for wheat and barley producers in West-
ern States.  As noted previously, the FAIR Act only addressed these pro-
grams by removing the requirement,  which had been introduced in 1994,
that farmers receiving benefits from major government programs purchase
catastrophic multiple peril crop insurance contracts.  Removal of this provi-
sion was widely sought by producers with very small acreages, for whom the
fixed catastrophic contract fee of $50 per crop made insurance contracts
quite expensive.  However, Congress had addressed federal crop insurance
subsidies, which averaged over $2 billion per year for all crops between 1990
and 1993, in the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994.  Under the
provisions of the 1994 Act, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation was
given a mandate to achieve substantial reductions in loss ratios and to in-
crease premium rates to accomplish that objective.
Effects of the 1996 Act on Wheat and Feed Grains
The FAIR Act reflects just one more step in a gradual evolution of U.S.
agricultural policy towards greater market orientation that began with the
1985 farm bill.  Most analyses of the 1996 Act suggest little change in acre-
age or prices for wheat and feed grains (USDA, 1996, FAPRI, 1996).  Dif-
ferences between these analyses are largely attributable to differences in as-
sumptions about how the USDA will implement the Conservation Reserve
Program and about future export market growth.
These findings are not surprising. The extended decoupling of producer in-
come support under the FAIR Act represents a marginal change from pro-
gram yield and base restrictions built into the provisions of the 1985 and
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   TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 91990 Acts.  Under the 1996 Act, producers will be able to receive payments
even if their land is in a conserving use, but producers already had flexibility
to idle crop acreage bases under the 0-85-92 programs.  Acreage reduction
programs have been eliminated, but ARP levels had already declined sig-
nificantly for most crops between the mid-1980s and 1995.  Most baseline
estimates suggest that, because of projected growth in export markets, fu-
ture ARP levels would have been zero for wheat and feed grains had the
1990 Act been continued.  The 1996 Act provides producers with two-way
flexibility; that is, they are now able to plant corn on soybean acreage as
well as soybeans on corn acreage.  However, aggregate forecasts indicate
that this legislative change will have little effect on production decisions.
Nevertheless, the  FAIR Act does provide producers with flexibility to re-
spond to changing market conditions.  This flexibility should tend to stabi-
lize rather than destabilize markets.
The effects on supply variability.  The FAIR Act has been criticized on the
grounds that it is likely to destabilize commodity markets.  Critics point to
the elimination of Acreage Reduction Programs and the fact that produc-
tion is now decoupled from income transfer payments.  But there are com-
pelling arguments that suggest acreage flexibility may lead to more stable
farm incomes because producers will be able to respond more effectively to
changing market conditions.  The 1996 crop year is a good case in point.
Poor weather affecting winter wheat acreage resulted in producers plowing
up some one million acres of winter wheat in Indiana and Illinois and re-
planting corn and soybeans.  Similarly, in response to relatively high ex-
pected prices for wheat, producers in the Northern Plains increased the
amount of land planted to spring wheat.  Under previous farm bills, base
restrictions would have prevented producers from overplanting their corn
and wheat bases or penalized wheat producers for planting soybeans on
wheat base.
Moreover, previous farm legislation restricted when ARP levels could be
announced and provided little recourse if market conditions changed sub-
stantially after the ARP announcements but  prior to planting.  For ex-
ample, under the 1990 Act, the Secretary of Agriculture was required to set
the feed grain ARP by no later than September 30 prior to the calendar year
in which the crop was to be harvested.  The Secretary was given authority
to make adjustments in that level by November 15 if it was determined that
there had been a significant change in the total supply of feed grains since
the program was first announced. After that date, the Secretary could allow
producers to participate on a voluntary basis in a reduction (increase) in the
set aside as long as their deficiency payments were offset accordingly. Even
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16 EFFECTS OF THE 1996 FARM BILL ...The net effect was to make changes in the ARP level difficult and largely
ineffectual after November 15 because of the offset in deficiency payments.
The decision to set the 1995 corn ARP at 7.5 percent has been widely criti-
cized, but when the initial decision was made in September 1994, the pro-
jected stocks-to-use level mandated a minimum 7.5 percent ARP.  It was
only after November 15, 1994 that export markets exploded and corn fu-
tures rose.  Had the 1996 farm bill been in place, it is quite possible that
producers would have planted more corn, thus dampening some of the in-
creases in corn prices that were experienced in 1996.
The effects on price and revenue variability.  Increased planting flexibility
should allow producers to react more quickly to changing market condi-
tions, hence acting to stabilize market prices. Critics have pointed to provi-
sions in the 1996 Act that suspended authority for operating the Farmer
Owned Reserve (FOR).  However, changes in the FOR since 1985, including
the lowering of loan rates, more restrictive entry, and storage payment pro-
visions made in the 1990 farm bill,  had probably marginalized the FOR by
the early 1990s.  Much has been made of the effects of the FAIR ACT on
the farm safety net.  Yet, as has already been pointed out, price-based
deficiency payments provided little income stability to producers whose yields
were positively correlated to national yields.  The droughts affecting wheat
producers in the Southern Plains in 1996 demonstrate that fixed market con-
tract payments can provide producers some income support for yield losses,
when target price-based deficiency payments would have been nonexistent.
Increased planting flexibility may also provide more income stability to pro-
ducers.  With respect to fixed payments, it should be noted that as these
payments decline over the duration of the Act, they will become less impor-
tant as a source of income stability.
Conclusions
Whether or not the FAIR Act leads to more substantial reform over the long
run remains an open question.  For many conservative policy makers, a ma-
jor selling point of Congressman Pat Robertss Freedom to Farm House Bill
was the abolishment of all permanent legislation for agricultural subsidies via
intervention in commodity markets, including the provisions of so-called per-
manent legislation in the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 1938 and 1949
that established essential elements of the loan rate program.  These provi-
sions were included in the House version of the 1996 farm bill but were
excluded from the Senates version.  In conference, the Senates version
prevailed, and the permanent legislation was preserved.
...although the 1996
Fair Act involves sub-
stantive changes in the
structure of U.S. agri-
cultural policy, its
actual effects on agri-
cultural  production
seem likely to be small.
   TRADE RESEARCH CENTER 11By 2002, Congress will have to readdress farm programs, including food
and feed grain policies or, yet again, be confronted with an expensive
revision to the provisions of the 1938 and 1949 farm bills.  One interpre-
tation of this aspect of the 1996 farm bill debate is that the market transi-
tion payments provided by the 1996 legislation will aid the farm sector as
it moves towards a new subsidy environment rather than a no subsidy
environment.  In the interim, although the FAIR Act involves substantive
changes in the structure of U.S. agricultural policy, its actual effects on
agricultural production seem likely to be small.  In addition, even the policy
initiatives incorporated in the FAIR Act represent more of an evolution-
ary approach to agricultural policy change than a revolutionary one.
...market transition
payments provided by
the 1996 legislation will
aid the farm sector as it
moves towards a new
subsidy environment
rather than a no
subsidy environment
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